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INTRODUCTION
Adam is in the tenth grade at a high school that Newsweek ranked in the
nation's top two hundred.' For twenty years, the Department of Education has
designated this school an "exemplary" high school. Since he was in the first
grade, Adam has had an "individualized education program" (IEP), meaning
that he is entitled to receive special education services under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 2 When he was born, Adam was
diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Thanks to very dedicated parents, he received
rigorous therapy and underwent multiple surgeries so that he is now able to
walk normally. Nevertheless, he has difficulty with fine motor skills and
especially struggles in his math classes. For example, Adam has a hard time
lining up numbers when completing a math problem and he finds it difficult to
write his answers clearly in the small blanks provided on worksheets and tests.
His IEP entitles him to several modifications, including extra time on tests and
enlarged text on assignments.
At the end of the first semester of his sophomore year, Adam went to
school prepared for his math exam. The teacher failed to implement any of the
modifications his IEP called for. Despite rigorous studying, Adam failed the
test with a score of sixty percent.
Adam's mother is a guidance counselor at a local school and received her
master's degree in education. She is well-versed in the procedural protections
the IDEA affords Adam and takes advantage of them by attending all of
Adam's IEP team meetings3 and requesting supplemental parent-teacher
conferences to monitor his progress. Despite her efforts, Adam's mother
cannot ensure that teachers will always provide his IEP modifications.
Thankfully, she asked Adam detailed questions about the math test and
realized what had happened. The next day she went to Adam's school and,
after much discussion, convinced the teacher to readminister the test with the
proper modifications. Upon retaking a different version of the two-hour exam,
Adam earned a score of eighty-eight percent.
Adam's mother knew that she was entitled to request that the school
correct its mistake because she works with students receiving special education
under the IDEA on a daily basis in her capacity as a guidance counselor.
Adam's mother did not receive any parental training upon Adam's placement
1. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Ryan, Guidance Counselor, Lynchburg City Pub. Sch.
(Mar. 8, 2007).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
3. See id. § 1414(d)(l)(B) •
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in an IEP to inform her of her legal rights. Such training is not required under
the law. The IDEA's procedural protections merely provide parents with a
brochure and require schools to contact parents before an evaluation or when
changes are made to a child's IEP. These safeguards often require an additional
level of ability and knowledge: many documents detail the processes in dense,
inaccessible language.4
Jeremy is a thirteen-year-old student in a large, urban school district.' At
the age of twelve, he remained in a third-grade classroom in a public school.
His physical size made social interactions difficult. This discomfort led to
discipline problems, resulting in fifty-three absences in one school year.
Jeremy's mother realized that something was wrong, and she repeatedly asked
the school to evaluate her son for learning disabilities. The school refused to
comply, and Jeremy's mother was unaware that she had alternatives to force
the school to act.
After five years of requests for an assessment, the school district finally
evaluated Jeremy and diagnosed him with two disabilities, making him eligible
for specialized services under the IDEA.6 Although the school's administrators
did agree to perform the evaluation, they did not release the results of the
evaluation for 142 days from the date Jeremy's mother gave her formal consent
to the evaluation. This is significantly longer than the sixty day period that the
IDEA allows for completion of evaluations.7 Jeremy's new IEP shows that his
oral language skills are at a second-grade level and his basic reading skills at a
third-grade level.
A five-year delay in evaluating a child for special education needs represents
almost one-half of the time that child will spend in the public school system. In
Jeremy's case, it appears that he was not learning at his full potential during
the five years he spent without an IEP. He will face a monumental challenge
4. Each state develops a notice of procedural protections for parents, and some states develop
publications that almost guarantee incomprehension. For example, Virginia's notice spans
forty-one pages and frequently employs acronyms unknown to the average parent. Div. OF
SPECIAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., YOUR FAMILY'S SPECIAL EDUCATION
RIGHTS (2007), available at http://www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Instruction/Sped/
proc-safe.pdf.
S. Sarah Carr, MPS Slow To See Boy Needed Help, Family Says; Judge Hearing Case on Students
with Disabilities, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 20o5, at 1B.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
7. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) (requiring that the evaluation be completed "within 6o days of
receiving parental consent for the evaluation"); see also id. § i414 (b)( 4)(B) (describing
procedures for the completion of an evaluation, including the requirement that "a copy of
the evaluation report and the documentation of determination of eligibility shall be given to
the parent").
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attempting to catch up with his peers so that he is able to graduate from high
school on time.
In principle, the IDEA gives every qualified child in the United States
access to special education. 8 As with many government-provided services,
however, individuals often must take affirmative action in order to receive
program benefits. Special education, whose consumers are children, presents
unique challenges with regard to asserting one's rights. Children do not have
the capacity to identify a disability or understand that their educational needs
differ from those of their classmates. They must rely on parents or teachers to
recognize their special needs and provide appropriate evaluation. As the IDEA
is currently structured, children who are entitled to special education depend
upon the school's provision of a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE), 9
or, alternatively, their parents' willingness and ability to advocate for them.
Adam's story illustrates that, even in an exemplary school, it is often still
necessary for someone effectively and assertively to advocate for a child in
order to receive the full benefits of special education. Jeremy's story shows that
in a school with more limited resources or professional expertise, well-
intentioned parental advocacy is often not enough to prevent children from
falling through the proverbial cracks. Because special education law today relies
upon a system of procedural protections without detailed substantive
requirements, schools can often make errors in judgment about the appropriate
treatment plan for a disabled child. Such a formulation assigns parents to be
the check on school systems, which is problematic in a system as complex and
varied as special education.
This Note argues that, in the context of special education, neither teachers
nor parents can act independently as effective representatives for children in the
realm of special education. The right to an adequate education has long been
an issue of great importance for policymakers in this country, in part because
the effects of education policy reach almost every family at some point in time.
In passing the IDEA, Congress recognized that public education should not
exclude children with disabilities, and thereby extended the benefits of free
public education to a class of children who, prior to the 197os, had been
drastically underserved.' ° Congress also recognized that advances in special
education have vastly improved the educational prospects of children with
8. As a condition of federal funding under the IDEA, states are required to engage in "child
find" activities, which demand that all children with disabilities residing in a given
jurisdiction be identified and evaluated, regardless of the severity of their disability. Id.
51412(a)(3)(A).
9. Id. § 14oo(d)(1)(A ) .
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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disabilities.11 Without effective advocacy, however, the promise of special
education for children with disabilities cannot be realized.
The absolute necessity of successful special education programs is well-
established. The successes of the disability rights movement over the past few
decades have resulted in the normalization of the movement's goals:
accommodation of difference, preparation for independent living, and the right
to work and participate fully in the community.'" For children with disabilities,
full participation in the community is largely achieved through special
education. In 1970, studies showed that nearly two million children with
disabilities were excluded entirely from public education. 3 Today, no state
allows public schools to exclude children, and as of 2003, 6.63 million
American students received specialized services under the IDEA. 4 Many
disability rights advocates emphasize the economic sensibility of special
education programs by stressing that integration and quality education will
always be less expensive over time than the forced dependency of disabled
people."
Despite enormous gains in the area of special education over the last few
decades, there is still much room for improvement in utilizing special
education programs to expand community participation and opportunities for
individuals with disabilities. Evidence suggests that in some instances
identification under the IDEA has not been sufficiently accurate. Despite
similar incidences of dyslexia in males and females, for example, four times as
many boys as girls are identified for special education.' 6 The blurry edges of
ii. Id. 5 1400(c)(5).
12. See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY 169-70, 178-79 (2d ed. 2oo) (describing the goals and successes of the
disability rights movement). The goals described here have been normalized through
various legislation, including the IDEA and its subsequent reauthorizations, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2000); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000).
13. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA 1 (1974).
14. THOMAS D. SNYDER, ALEXANDRIA G. TAN & CHARLENE M. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 82 tbl. 5 2 (2oo6), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2oo6/zip/2oo6o3o.zip.
15. FRED PELKA, THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION TO THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 113 (1997).
16. Stanley S. Herr, Special Education Law and Children with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28
J.L. & EDUC. 337, 341-42 & n.20 (1999) (citing Sally E. Shaywitz et al., Prevalence of Reading
Disability in Boys and Girls: Results of the Connecticut Longitudinal Study, 264 JAMA 998, lOOl
(1990)).
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the definition of disability' 7 may enable problems of accuracy in the
identification of students and the provision of special education. Nonetheless,
enhanced representation and assistance for parents in their advocacy efforts
would address these concerns of equity and accuracy in the provision of special
education. This Note endeavors to address the failures of the special education
system by proving that parents of students receiving special education are in
dire need of external expert assistance.
Part I of the Note explores the history of special education initiatives since
the 1970s. This discussion also includes a brief history of the role of parents in
special education prior to the IDEA and of the ways in which that history
motivated the formulation of parental participation in current federal special
education laws.
Part II examines the current legislative landscape, focusing on the IDEA
and its provisions. This discussion shows the heavy emphasis the IDEA places
on parental advocacy. The IDEA requires, for example, that parents be notified
and have the opportunity to participate whenever a school initiates an
evaluation or changes the placement of their child. This Part argues that the
current system of procedural safeguards lacks detailed substantive benchmarks
and as such relies almost exclusively on parental advocacy to ensure procedural
compliance.
Part III problematizes the assumption made by the IDEA that parents are
well-equipped to act as a child's advocate in special education matters. This
Part first discusses the need for special education advocacy by introducing
several reasons why schools are sometimes unable to fulfill their obligations.
For example, chronic federal underfunding and the local politics of school
budgets limit the resources schools have to spend on special education, which
often creates an incapacity to appropriately identify and serve all students with
special needs. After demonstrating that schools may not always have the
capacity to provide children with adequate services, this Part discusses parental
advocacy and argues that special education represents an area of the law where
parents, acting alone, are usually not the best child advocates. Parents often
lack the necessary knowledge about disability and educational options, and
often have difficulty interfacing with school officials in special education
proceedings. These gaps in knowledge and ability make it difficult for parents
to advocate effectively for their children without any external help.
17. Id. at 342 (citing Ted Miller, Looking for Order: Health Promotion, Disability Prevention, and
the Disability Classification System of the World Health Organization, in THE SECOND FIFTY
YEARS: PROMOTING HEALTH AND PREVENTING DISABILITY 311, 318 (Robert L. Berg & Joseph
S. Cassells eds., 199o)).
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Understanding the problems of parent advocates in special education leads
into the Note's final Part, which proposes several policy options for external
advocacy. These options should be viewed as a first step in increasing
procedural protections for children receiving special education, and the various
options will represent a range of policy choices that can be customized for
individual school districts. Admittedly, there is little empirical evidence as to
what type of program would be effective. This Note concludes that educational
agencies or nonprofit organizations should fund pilot programs based on the
various policy proposals presented here to determine what would work in
various jurisdictions.
I. THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION INITIATIVES
Special education is, without question, a fundamental part of our modern
educational system. Although there is persistent debate about the underlying
theories of the IDEA, very few would advocate the abolition of special
education altogether. It is useful for the purposes of this Note to examine the
historical developments that led to the passage of the IDEA, the landmark
special education legislation. Understanding the problems faced by children
and their parents prior to the passage of the IDEA will illuminate the goals of
the Act. This Part will also describe the importance of parental involvement in
the special education process, which underscores the need to provide parents
with extra help so that they are able to advocate effectively for their children.
Prior to the 1970s, special education was not on the political radar. The
understanding of special education as a civil right for disabled people largely
stemmed from the efforts of disability rights advocates who worked to change
the conception of disability in the United States. Through the early 1970s,
disability policy adhered to the medical model of disability "in which people
with disabilities were presumed unable to function independently in the
mainstream of social, economic, and political life.' 8 The disability rights
movement worked to shift public conceptions away from a medical model of
disability, which locates symptoms of a perceived illness within a person and
focuses on how to treat those symptoms, 9 toward a social model of disability,
which "focuses on how existing social arrangements handicap individuals. 20
This shift in awareness confronted physical and social barriers built by a
18. SCOTCH, supra note 12, at 169.
19. DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
TO SELF-DETERMINATION 4-5 (2003).
20. Id. at 15.
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majority that perceived human deviation as defective. 2 Therefore, facilitating
full community participation of the disabled was a key objective of disability
policy. Special education has become an essential tool in implementing the
disability rights movement's objectives.
As this Note shows, parents have always been and should continue to be
central to efforts to obtain equality for children with disabilities. Mobilization
before the 1970s, however, was difficult because most parents and disability
advocates worked through single-disability organizations.2 ' The medical model
of disability policy prevented cross-disability mobilization because its goal was
to allow disabled people to fit into existing social structures. Single-disability
groups also feared that cooperative efforts might, for example, cause resources
to be shifted away from their respective groups. This separation of advocacy
efforts, along with the incredible diversity of anything that might be called a
"disability community,2 3 impeded combined parental efforts to advocate for
special education.
One of the most important factors in mobilizing disability rights and
special education advocates was section 504 in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which prohibited any and all discrimination on the basis of disability within
federally funded programs. 4 Although most members of Congress in 1973 did
not expect section 504 to amount to anything more than a "platitude," 5 the
regulations developed by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare framed section 504 as a declaration of civil
rights for disabled people. 6 Section 504 set the stage for a shift in the way
society viewed disability, which in turn led to a broad push for social
accommodation. This development contributed to a realization that public
school systems should accommodate disabled students and was a factor in the
evolution of modern special education.
21. Id. at 16 tbl.l.1.
22. Id. at 50-53 & tbl.2.2 (discussing the work of the National Association of the Deaf, the
National Federation of the Blind, and the United Cerebral Palsy Association).
23. Legal definitions of disability encompass vastly diverse physical, mental, and emotional
conditions, which for many years resulted in a lack of cohesion within the disability
community. Due to the disparity among conditions labeled as "disability," people were
traditionally reluctant to identify themselves with others who did not share their condition.
See SCOTCH, supra note 12, at 6.
24. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)); see also
SCOTCH, supra note 12, at 52.
25. SCOTCH, supra note 12, at 54.
26. Id. at 63.
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In 1975, Congress reported that more than fifty percent of the eight million
"handicapped" children in the United States were not receiving adequate
educational services and that nearly two million children were excluded from
public education entirely.27 This exclusion had existed since the inception of
public schooling. Most disabled students were denied any educational
opportunities or were educated in special facilities such as Thomas Hopkins
Gallaudet's American School for the Deaf in Hartford, founded in 1817, and the
Perkins Institute and Massachusetts School for the Blind in Boston, founded in
1823.28 By the 196os, a larger number of disabled children were permitted to
attend public schools, but they were placed in severely substandard academic
programs. They were separated from the general student population in special
education or "health conservation" classes, which were often located in
basements or boiler rooms. School officials regarded special education as day
care for disabled students.2 9
The poor state of special education in this country became a particularly
salient issue after the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, which
represented a "sea change in the legal approach to students that based on group
characteristics faced separation or exclusion. '30 Although the Brown Court's
holding did not affect special education directly, its statement of the
importance of education is helpful in understanding the changes taking place
in the second half of the twentieth century.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
27. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432; see also
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, supra note 13, at 1 (" [N]early two million children.., were not
enrolled in school [in 1970].").
28. SCOTCH, supra note 12, at 16.
29. PELKA, supra note 15, at ill.
30. Perry A Zirkel, Does Brown v. Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in Special Education
Law?, 34 J.L. &EDUC. 255, 270 (2005).
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has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.
3
'
Two landmark cases in the early 1970s, holding that exclusion policies
illegally denied students with disabilities access to public education, bolstered
the disability rights movement's efforts to improve special education programs.
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) and a
group of thirteen parents of mentally retarded children brought a class action
challenging a Pennsylvania statute that excluded retarded children from
education and training in public schools.32 The lawsuit resulted in the approval
of a consent agreement that mandated equality of access to education and
emphasized a preference for mainstreamed education.33 The consent agreement
in PARC acknowledged that "mentally retarded persons are capable of
benefiting from a program of education and training."34
In 1972, the parents of seven students with disabilities in Washington,
D.C., brought a similar lawsuit. In Mills v. Board of Education, the D.C. District
Court held that the denial of public educational services to children with special
needs violates the Due Process Clause.3" In addition to declaring that all
children, regardless of disability, were entitled to public education, the court
also enunciated the rule that limited financial resources could not justify the
denial of services to a disabled child.
36
The Mills and PARC decisions represented an assertion by federal courts
that children with disabilities have the same rights to public education as do
other children. These cases served as powerful tools for the special education
movement. By 1975, lawyers had filed forty-six right-to-education cases in
twenty-eight jurisdictions, basing their arguments on the Mills and PARC
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
32. Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The primary Pennsylvania statutes challenged in PARC relieved the public schools from
"the obligation of providing education or training" for children certified as "uneducable or
untrainable." See id. at 1264.
33. Id. at 1257-58. Mainstreamed education refers to the inclusion of students receiving special
education services in regular education classrooms rather than isolating them in special
education classes. The IDEA shows a preference for mainstreamed education by requiring
that students be placed in the "least restrictive environment" possible as part of their
individualized education program. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) (2000).
34. Id. at 1259.
3s. 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972).
36. Id. at 876.
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precedents.37 Moreover, it was these two landmark decisions that set the stage
for Congress to recognize a disabled child's right to special education.
Shortly after the Mills decision, Congress passed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) of 1975, which granted unprecedented
educational rights to children with disabilities. 38 In 199o, Congress renamed
the Act as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),3 9 although
the substantive law remained the same. This legislation, which now provides
6.6 million students with specialized educational services ,4 is the legislative
centerpiece of this Note and will be simultaneously celebrated and criticized.
The IDEA requires state educational agencies to provide a free appropriate
public education (FAPE) at public expense to all students. 4' The
implementation of the FAPE is based on principles such as the development of
an individualized education program (IEP)4' and placement in the "least
restrictive environment" (LRE) .13
In addition to creating the political impetus for federal legislation, PARC
and Mills were important because they gave parents of disabled children the
opportunity to participate in the educational decision-making process for the
first time. 44 Prior to the development of special education laws, many parents
begged for educational services for their children with special needs, only to be
turned away because they lacked legal rights. 41 Unfortunately, even with
enhanced rights under PARC and Mills, "many parents were still intimidated
by school professionals or misinformed about school proposals for educating
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 3 (1975); see also REED MARTIN, EDUCATING HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN: THE LEGAL MANDATE 15 (1979) (stating that thirty-six lawsuits had been filed in
twenty-seven jurisdictions by 1975).
38. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
39. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat.
1103, 1141-42 (renaming the EAHCA as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)). Although the 199o amendments changed the name of the Act, the substantive and
procedural requirements remained largely the same. The name change signified a move
away from the use of the term "handicapped."
40. SNYDERETAL.,supra note 14, at 81 tbl.5o.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 14oo(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2004).
42. Id. § 1414(d).
43. Id. § 1412(a)(5). For a more complete discussion of these substantive requirements, see infra
Part II.
44. Herr, supra note 16, at 350.
45. Frederick J. Weintraub & Alan R. Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped
Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037, 1042-44 (1972) (recounting how a
parent unsuccessfully tried to obtain services for her son for two years).
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their children. ''46 The ineffectiveness of parental advocacy under a regime of
judicially imposed rights led Congress to believe that a statutory regime was
necessary to ensure the provision of special education to disabled children. In
its consideration of the EAHCA, Congress acknowledged that "[p]arents of
handicapped children all too frequently are not able to advocate the rights of
their children. 47
Perhaps because Congress acknowledged the historical powerlessness of
parents in the special education arena and parents were instrumental in
spearheading the movement toward more widely available special education
services, 8 the EAHCA (now the IDEA) created a cooperative relationship
between parents and school districts.49 Professor David Engel has argued that
"[t]he choice to involve parents in the decisionmaking process reflects the
drafters' belief that the educational opportunities and rights of children with
disabilities could best be protected by creating a new arena for controlled
interaction between parents and educators.""°
The integral role of parents in the IDEA is not surprising. Our legal and
social systems recognize parents as the most effective representatives of their
children's general interests. Indeed, "[p] arents' strong emotional attachment to
their children and considerable knowledge of their particular needs make
parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their
children's best interests in most circumstances."'" While states have a
legitimate interest in regulating public education, 2 ultimate control over the
46. Herr, supra note 16, at 350.
47. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
48. Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's Perspective and
Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 331, 362 (1994) ("Such insistence on parental
rights is hardly surprising in light of the fact that the prime impetus for reform came from
parent groups.").
49. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the
Construction ofDifference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 167.
50. Id. at 170 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-664, at 43 (1975) (Conf. Rep.)). Part II explains the
structure of the IDEA and the relationship between parents and school districts in further
detail.
51. Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 647 (2002); see also ANNE L. ALSTOTT, No
EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004);
JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 157-59 (1982).
52. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[It] seems
entirely appropriate that the State use 'public schools [to] ... inculcat[e] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))).
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education of children has traditionally remained with the family. 3 Parents,
however, often delegate decision-making power about routine educational
decisions to public schools in the interest of efficiency.14 Nonetheless, they
retain the right to intervene when the school makes a mistake or what the
parent perceives to be an error in judgment."s As a very basic example of a
parent's role as representative in a general education situation, consider the
following: if a high school student requests to be placed in Advanced
Placement has the capacity to do advanced work, but is placed in a general
education track, it is expected that the student's parent will intervene. Given
the presumptively continuous parent-child relationship, the parent has a more
extensive knowledge of what curriculum the child is capable of taking, whereas
the school is juggling the curriculum decisions of hundreds of students.
Additionally, we assume that the intimacy and longevity of the parent-child
relationship endows that parent with the motivation to intervene. The school is
not likely to be as individually invested in this particular student and could let
the mistake slip by unnoticed.
Given that parents are integral to a child's development due to their
partiality and specific knowledge, we would expect that they should participate
in some capacity in their child's educational experience. Professor Anne Alstott
has written that "[t]oday, children must interact with a variety of large,
impersonal institutions. The assumption that parents will faithfully represent
their children's interests is ingrained in virtually all of our public institutions
for children's care." 6 This expectation, however, does not change the fact that
teachers and administrators remain the experts on education. Our system
expects these educational experts to form a team with the parent, who fills the
s3. Kotler, supra note 48, at 36o-61 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding
that Amish parents are not obligated to comply with compulsory education laws); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (holding that it is impermissible to ban instruction
on foreign languages because such a law infringes on parents' decision-making authority);
Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 66 (1874) (preserving the parent's "paramount right ... to
make a reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed course which his child shall
pursue")).
54. See Engel, supra note 49, at 187.
ss. Although parents are not required by the IDEA to correct schools' mistakes, they are the
only party identified in the IDEA who has standing to challenge an agency's decisions about
a child's evaluation or existing IEP. See 2o U.S.C. § 1415(0(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)
(stating that parents have "an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing" when they
have complaints about the provision of services by the school district). To further show that
the statute envisions parents taking on such roles, see id. § 14 15 (b)(2), which requires the
assignment of a parent surrogate for certain classes of children whose parents are
unavailable.
56. ALSTOTT, supra note 51, at 18.
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role of the child-specific expert.17 Within this role, parents are a critical
participant in any diagnostic stage of education. For example, when a parent
first meets with a teacher, she can say that the child can tie her shoes but has
trouble remembering her colors. The teacher then knows what areas to focus
on. Additionally, parents can report on a child's progress in ways a teacher
cannot. For example, if a child has historically excelled in reading but has
struggled with multiplication, the parent is uniquely situated to provide a
global understanding of the child's abilities. In this way, parents are essential
in developing remedial programs.
This broad understanding of parents as important representatives of their
child's interests, combined with the historical boxing out of parents in special
education matters, motivated the IDEA to involve parents at every step of the
process, from diagnosis to the development of an IEP. This Note argues that
despite parents' essential role in the special education decision-making process,
however, external advocates must supplement parents' efforts in order to
achieve results in the best interest of the child.
II. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS WITHIN THE IDEA
The central purpose of the IDEA is to provide disabled students with a free
appropriate public education s8 The EAHCA of 1975 provided a rather vague
definition of a FAPE, requiring only that it be provided at public expense,
utilize an IEP, and conform to state educational standards."s The Supreme
Court's decision in Rowley further clarified that definition, explaining that "the
'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the handicapped child.'' 6' The Rowley decision was
significant in that it limited the FAPE to require not optimal achievement, but
simply the provision of "some form of specialized education. ''61 This limited
57. Buss, supra note Si, at 647.
S8. 20 U.S.C. § 14 oo(d)(i)(A) (2000 & Supp. TV 2004).
5g. Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, S 4(a)(18), 89 Stat. 773,
775. For further discussion on the statutory requirements of a FAPE, see MARY KONYA
WEISHAAR, CASE STUDIES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT AND
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT 3-18 (2007).
6o. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982).
61. Id. at 195.
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view of a FAPE broadened school districts' discretion to decide what
specialized educational services to provide.
The IDEA now measures the appropriateness of a FAPE by considering a
number of factors, the most important of which are the development of an IEP
and placement in the least restrictive environment (LRE). The Act defines an
IEP as "a written statement for each child with a disability" that describes a
student's current level of achievement, measurable annual goals, any
specialized services required to help meet those goals, and the type of
educational environment in which the student will be placed.62 The Supreme
Court has stated that each provision of a student's IEP must be accompanied
by a probable benefit to that child, thereby trimming the number of services
required by a FAPE.
63
An IEP is developed after an initial determination that a child has a
disability and must be written cooperatively by a multidisciplinary team. This
"IEP team" must include at least one regular education teacher of the child and
one special education teacher or service provider who has worked with the
child. 6' The team must also include a representative of the school district who
is knowledgeable about the availability of special education resources. 6' The
statute requires parents to be involved in this meeting,6 6 but as will be
discussed in Section III.B, parents often do not feel empowered to
meaningfully participate in IEP team meetings. The IEP team must revise IEPs
at least annually to determine whether or not the child's goals are being met.6 7
Under the IDEA, the development of an IEP must include an affirmative
statement describing the student's educational placement.68 To further explain
this requirement, the LRE mandate states that
[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities ... are [to be] educated with children who are not
disabled, and [separation] ... occurs only when the nature or
severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
63. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-01. The Court in Rowley did not announce a test for evaluating
whether a service or program provides an educational benefit to a child, but instead chose to
analyze such benefits on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 202.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
6S. Id. § 1414 (d)(i)(B)(iv).
66. Id. 5 1414 (d)(i)(B)(i).
67. Id. § 14 14(d)( 4 )(A)(i).
68. Id. § 141 4(d)(i)(A)(iv).
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regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily.",
61
It is interesting to note that some courts have ruled that the FAPE limits
articulated by Rowley do not apply in the context of determining the LRE. 7°
That is, while school districts are not required under Rowley to provide all
services which might benefit a child, they cannot, under the LRE requirement,
choose to place a student in an environment that is any more restrictive than
necessary. Therefore, schools have less discretion in choosing where to place
students with disabilities than they do in choosing which specialized services to
provide. The Department of Education regulations currently require that
school districts implement a "continuum of alternative placements" to be used
when full-time placement in a regular education classroom is not feasible.71
As evidenced by the vague and malleable definitions of these substantive
requirements, the IDEA is a unique statute with an "unconventional,
decentralized system of decisionmaking."7" Rather than detailing the specific
services required under the Act,73 the IDEA outlined "extensive procedural"
protections for parents and students and relied heavily on those procedures to
effect the Act's purpose.74 Congress may have chosen this unconventional
method of legislating due to a federalism concern: since education has
traditionally been the purview of states, Congress was concerned that any
federal imposition of substantive requirements would severely limit states'
discretion over public education.7" Another possible reason for the heavy
reliance on procedure is that "the immense variety of disabilities and needs
69. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
70. Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as an Entitlement to Educational
Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAvis J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 147, 15o (2001) (citing inter alia
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.zd 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest
R-i Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987)).
71. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.115
(2007).
72. Engel, supra note 49, at 168.
73. See id. at 167.
74. Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs of a "Free" Education: The Impact of Schaffer v. Weast
and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, 57 DuKE L.J. 457, 464 (2007).
75. Engel, supra note 49, at 176 (citing E. LEVINE & E. WExLER, P.L. 94-142: AN AcT OF
CONGRESS 90-91 (1981); David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered:
The Case of Special Education, LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 63, 71; Note,
Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of1975, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1979)).
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made it difficult to formulate universally applicable substantive standards." 6
In the face of numerous physical, mental, and emotional disabilities, it would
have been exceedingly difficult for Congress to create a "menu" of educational
options to be provided for every disability category.
An additional factor motivating the use of procedural protections in the
absence of substantive requirements was the recognition that schools have
limited resources. The IDEA does not mandate that each student receive the
best possible education,7 but rather that disabled students have access to a
FAPE with a focus on specialized services. 8
Given that the structure of the IDEA affords school districts significant
discretion over the services they choose to provide, the Act provides students
and their parents with various procedural safeguards. 79 The IDEA specifies in
some detail the notice that schools must provide parents at each stage in the
process so that the parents may decide if, when, and how to influence or
challenge special education decisions."' The Act requires local education
agencies to provide this notice in "easily understandable" language upon the
initial referral for evaluation of the child, before each IEP meeting, and upon
presentation of any complaint by the parent.8i In addition to the notice
requirement, the Act stipulates two main procedural safeguards.
First, the educational agency must provide "an opportunity for the parents
of a child with a disability to examine all records relating to such child and to
participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and
educational placement of the child ... and to obtain an independent
educational evaluation of the child. ,
82
76. Id.
77. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 196-97 (1982) (suggesting that Congress's use of
"appropriate education" in the EAHCA required only the provision of "some form of
specialized educational services" and not all services required to maximize the student's
educational potential).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
7g. See H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at 5 (1996) (suggesting the importance of "very detailed"
procedural safeguards to protect parents and children); S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 (articulating the necessity to "provide procedures
for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed
procedural safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of handicapped children").
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
81. Id. § 14 15(d)(1)-(2).
82. Id. § 1415(b)(1).
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Second, parents must have the opportunity to seek mediation, or to present
complaints "with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a
[FAPE]."83 If a parent submits a complaint that complies with all notice and
form requirements,4 then a due process hearing will be scheduled. 8 Current
Department of Education regulations require that any hearing must be
conducted by an impartial hearing officer who is not employed by the local
education agency involved in the hearing.16 During a hearing, the statute
permits parents to be represented by counsel, examine witnesses, and provide
evidence.87
The 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA stated that "the implementation of
this title has been impeded by low expectations, 88 and that results could be
improved through "strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and
ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at home.
8
,
Although the amendments endeavored to strengthen procedural protections,
some new provisions appear to limit those protections.
For example, the amendments appear to limit protections for parents by
imposing a statute of limitations on complaints against school districts: once
two years have passed since the decision in question, a parent loses her right to
a due process hearing, except in cases involving fraud or misrepresentations by
the school.9" If a parent or other party chooses to appeal a hearing officer's
decision by filing an action in federal court, they now must do so within ninety
days.9 ' Furthermore, Congress's efforts to reduce the paperwork burden on
school districts had the ancillary effect of limiting procedural protections: the
2004 amendments only require school officials to provide the procedural
safeguards notice to parents once a year.92
83. Id. § 1415(b)(5)-(6 ).
84. Id. § 1415 (b)(7)(A).
85. Id. § 1415 (f).
86. 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2007).
87. Id. § 300.512.
88. Pub. L. No. lo8-446, § 6o1(c)(4), 118 Stat. 2647, 2649 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400
(Supp. V 2004)).
89. Id. § 6oi(c)(S)(B), i18 Stat. at 2649.
9o. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
91. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B).
92. Id. § 1415 (d)(i)(A). Although school districts are generally only required to provide parents
with the procedural safeguards notice once per year, the notice must also be made available
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In addition to the IDEA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197393 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)94 provide additional legal rights for
students receiving special education services. For example, because the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act are civil rights statutes as opposed to funding
statutes, a student or his parent bringing an IDEA lawsuit against a school
district can also allege violations of the ADA or section 504. In some cases, this
is advantageous for the litigant as section 504 has a longer statute of limitations
and, unlike the IDEA, provides money damages in most jurisdictions.95 These
statutes otherwise provide largely the same substantive rights as the IDEA,96
although without the benefit of similar procedural protections.
In theory, the procedural protections offered by the IDEA and other federal
legislation could adequately protect the rights of disabled students by relying
on parents to act as a check on the school system. The IDEA imagines a team
approach wherein the school and parents work together to devise the best plan
of action.97 If the school fails, the IDEA envisions that parents will intervene.
However, the vague descriptions of a FAPE in the text of the legislation fail to
upon the initial referral or request for evaluation, anytime a complaint is filed, and upon the
parent's request. Id.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.").
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
95. See Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 5o4/ADA, 178 WEST's EDUC. L.
REP. 629,632 (2003); see also Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 78 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that Congress abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
Rehabilitation Act, and plaintiffs bringing suit under section 504 can seek monetary
damages); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cit. 1992)
(approving the application of a two-year statute of limitations to section 504); Andalusia
City Bd. of Educ. v. Andress, 916 F. Supp. 1179, 1184-85 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that the
statute of limitations to appeal a decision is thirty days under the IDEA and two years under
section 504).
96. Although section 504 and the ADA may provide additional claims for litigants in special
education cases, the IDEA remains the most important statute for students and parents.
Unlike section 504 and the ADA, the IDEA specifically concerns special education and is
therefore more useful and authoritative in the day to day coordination of special education
services.
97. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-17, at 19 (1997) ("The bill specifies that the determination of a
child's eligibility is to be made by a qualified team of professionals and the child's
parents.").
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provide useful direction as to what services students are entitled to receive. 8
One helpful benchmark would be an educational "menu" of sorts for each
child, or even for each type of disability. For instance, in the case of a child with
autism, a useful substantive protection would be a mandate that schools must
choose the most appropriate individualized program from a list of treatments,
including applied behavior analysis (ABA),99 floortime therapy, ' occupational
therapy,"' speech therapy, or the school-based TEACCH method (Treatment
and Education of Autistic and Related Communication-Handicapped
Children). ' As it stands, no such menu exists, and Part III will show that this
omission often creates an insurmountable obstacle to advocacy for parents.
The lack of clarity in the substantive requirements of the Act and the
obstacles faced by parents in challenging school decisions contribute to some of
the criticism of the IDEA. A parent himself, Professor Marvin Kotler writes
that
[a]mbiguity and disagreement regarding what constitutes a
substantively "appropriate" program are commonplace. The
formalistic procedures to protect parental rights have not
served to level the playing fields between parents and
educators. Procedural protections all too often have been
reduced to mere empty ritual for all but the most educated and
wealthy.103
Moreover, states have difficulty providing parents with useful
interpretations of FAPE and LRE requirements because parents who challenge
IEP decisions usually do so within the confines of IEP team meetings. Very
98. While this Note does not challenge the validity of federalism concerns motivating
Congress's choice to leave discretion on substantive issues to the states, it does seem clear
that the structure of the Act necessitates greater protection for parents than the simple
provision of a notice of procedural safeguards.
99. See generally Alexis Ann Schoen, What Potential Does the Applied Behavior Analysis Approach
Have for the Treatment of Children and Youth with Autism?, 30 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 125
(2003) (describing the features of ABA treatment models).
1oo. See Stanley I. Greenspan & Serena Wieder, Climbing the Symbolic Ladder in the DIR Model
Through Floor Time/Interactive Play, 7 AUTISM 425,427-29 (2003).
lo1. See generally Geraldine Dawson & Renee Wating, Interventions to Facilitate Auditory, Visual,
and Motor Integration in Autism: A Review of the Evidence, 30 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISORDERS 415, 416, 419 (2000).
102. See S. Panerai, L. Ferrante & M. Zingale, Benefits of the Treatment and Education of Autistic
and Communication Handicapped Children (TEACCH) Programme as Compared with a Non-
specific Approach, 46 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 318,321-22 (2002).
103. Kotler, supra note 48, at 341.
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rarely do parents request due process hearings,' °4 and even more rarely do they
bring lawsuits in federal district court. Therefore, precedent is not outlined in
judicial opinions and schools and parents seeking to apply judicial
interpretation of the IDEA in formulating an IEP cannot utilize prior decisions.
The delegation of the development of substantive requirements to the states
has simply not materialized in the way Congress imagined.
The most interesting question for this discussion is whether the team
approach employed by the IDEA can be salvaged. The statute's use of
procedural protections to facilitate parental involvement has not been as
successful as Congress had hoped,' but this Note suggests that the addition of
an external advocate could function to give parents "greater power to influence
decisions" '' °6 and thereby give life to the system of procedural protections and
minimal substantive requirements envisioned by the IDEA. The next Part
discusses at greater length why the current procedural safeguards are often
ineffective. In short, there are certain gaps in parental knowledge that impede
effective advocacy. Schools have great discretion in forming IEPs for disabled
children, and due to these gaps in knowledge, parents are unlikely to know
when or how to challenge a school's discretionary decision.
III. DANGEROUS ASSUMPTIONS: WHY SCHOOLS AND PARENTS FAIL
UNDER THE IDEA
A. IDEA Compliance Challenges Faced by Public Schools
The structure of the IDEA gives local educational agencies great latitude in
designing the substance of special education programs for students with special
needs. Because children do not often have the capacity to make
recommendations about their own special education programs, 0 7 they must
rely on parents or school officials to recognize their special needs and to
provide appropriate evaluation and services.
104. Kristen Rickey, Special Education Due Process Hearings: Student Characteristics, Issues, and
Decisions, 14 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 46, 46 (2003).
105. See Kotler, supra note 48, at 366.
1o6. Id.
107. The IDEA only allows a child to be a participant in IEP team meetings "whenever
appropriate," giving schools wide discretion to include or exclude a child in these meetings.
34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a)(7) (2007). Transition service planning begins at age fourteen, and
requires that one year before the student reaches the age of majority he or she is informed of
IDEA rights. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII)(cc) (Supp. IV 2004).
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In terms of education, courts have recognized that states have a legitimate
interest in regulating public education and are therefore charged with the
responsibility for providing public schools. However, Congress has repeatedly
awarded final decision-making power on questions of education to parents. 
8
Parents often delegate that decision-making power about routine educational
decisions to public schools in the interest of efficiency. 9 In the realm of special
education, however, sometimes schools fail to implement adequate special
education programs for students, and parents are required to reclaim their
decision-making authority.
This Section focuses on several reasons why schools are sometimes unable
to fulfill their obligations to each and every student: inadequate funding, the
individualization of the IDEA, and the burdensome paperwork requirements
that the statute places on schools.
1. Inadequate State and Federal Funding for Special Education
Although the IDEA has created countless new opportunities for students
with disabilities, the federal government has never provided adequate funding
to states, and therefore special education demands often encroach on funds for
general education."' The IDEA states that the federal government will provide
states with grants to assist in the provision of special education and that the
maximum grant will be equal to the number of children receiving services
multiplied by forty percent of the national average per pupil expenditure."'
Congress has never provided the maximum grant; federal funding, on average,
has been provided to states at fifteen percent of the per pupil expenditure."2
Without sufficient federal funding, schools must rely on localities to provide
funds. This reliance asks schools and special education advocates to confront
the intense politics of local taxation: school boards that increase budgets are
io8. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
iog. See Engel, supra note 49, at 187 ("Few parents of children without disabilities would expect
to meet with their child's teacher before the school year begins and to cooperate in the
creation of an educational plan uniquely suited to their child's needs. Nor would most
teachers welcome this degree of parental involvement."). For a more complete discussion of
this balance of power, see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
11o. See Kelly Rozmus Barnes, Special Education Finance: An Examination of the Impact of
Compliance Requirements on Special Education Resources (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law School Library), microfortned on UMI No. 3149828
(UMI Microform Servs.).
111. 20 U.S.C. S 1411(a)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
112. Barnes, supra note 11o, at 5-6.
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essentially asking for higher property taxes. In general, homeowners are
favorable to (modest) increases in property taxes for the purposes of improving
local schools. Professor William Fischel has described this as the "homevoter
hypothesis": the quality of public schools is widely understood to have a
causative relationship with property values, meaning that increased quality of
public schools is believed to trigger increases in property values."3 Therefore,
budget increases for regular education do not necessarily face intense
opposition. Budget increases tied to special education, however, often confront
significant political obstacles. For example, many parents of "regular
education" children see special education budgets as encroaching upon the
funds available to their own children tend to oppose special education
funding.11 4 Consequently, the "homevoter hypothesis" would not apply to
increased budgets or appropriations for special education. For these reasons,
combined with underwhelming federal funding, it is particularly difficult for
schools to provide adequate special education services to all eligible students.
When schools cannot increase their budgets for special education, they are
forced to perform a balancing act between providing services for students
receiving special education services and those in the general student
population. As discussed in Part II, the Rowley decision is most authoritative
and comprehensive interpretation of a FAPE. In Rowley, the Court considered
whether or not a school district was required under the IDEA to provide an
interpreter for a deaf student. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that the
student did not need an interpreter in order to receive a FAPE. In so holding,
the Court interpreted the IDEA as only requiring the provision of some
services. This holding adopted the Mills view of special education: "Mills ...
speaks in terms of 'adequate' educational services ... and sets a realistic
standard of providing some educational services to each child when every need
cannot be met." ' The Rowley decision creates a frustrating interplay between
limited resources and special education: the funding dilemma often makes it
impossible for schools to comply with the IDEA and can discourage student
113. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
(2001) (discussing the politics of local taxation in general and noting that homeowners are
often willing to pay for the betterment of public schools). But see James M. Poterba,
Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public Education, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 48 (1997) (stating that municipalities with large elderly populations are more hostile
to property tax increases for the purpose of improving schools).
114. Hamilton Lankford & James Wyckoff, The Allocation of Resources to Special Education and
Regular Instruction, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN
EDUCATION 221, 228 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
115. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 193 n.15 (1982) (citations omitted).
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evaluations and the implementation of expensive treatments. Without some
outside advocacy by the child's representative, many school districts simply
will not perform initial evaluations or subsequent revisions to ensure a child's
IEP is effective. Part IV of this Note argues that an external advocate could
prevent school districts from disadvantaging individual students as a result of
tight budgets. Through zealous and individualized advocacy, an external
advocate can prevent a school district from interpreting Rowley in a way that
would not provide an individual student with a FAPE.
2. The Difficulty of Implementing Highly Individualized Programs
Another reason schools often find it challenging to comply with the IDEA
is the highly individualized nature of the statute. The underlying theory
suggests that "[sIince each child is unique, and each child with disabilities has
unique educational strengths and weaknesses, special education attempts to
address and redress these strengths and weaknesses one child at a time. '6 It
can therefore be difficult for schools accurately to predict their annual
expenditures on special education. A state's choice of education finance policy
can further compound this difficulty. The predominant funding structure used
for special education in the United States1 7 is the "Pupil Weight Model,"
which allocates funding by special education enrollment, type of disability, and
type of placement."' Inaccurate predictions lead to insufficient allocations of
funding and thereby create another reason why schools are often unable to
evaluate and provide services to students who exceed their original special
education budget.
3. Paperwork Burdens of the IDEA
Finally, the IDEA has become quite burdensome for schools. In California,
for example, there are seventy-two components to each child's individualized
education program, and each reauthorization of the Act brings with it
116. Barnes, supra note 11o, at 4. The individualized nature of the statute also leads to great
variation in identification and treatment methods employed by various school districts. See
Herr, supra note 16, at 341 ("Thousands of local public school systems, with only poorly
articulated connections to other agencies that come into contact with children with learning
disabilities, have widely variable policies and practices on their identification and
placement.").
117. States have discretion as to which financing structure they use. For a full discussion of
financing structures for special education, see Barnes, supra note iio.
,iB. Id. at 22.
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additional requirements for compliance." 9 One recent national study found
that special education teachers spend an average of 4.7 hours per week on
paperwork, while general education teachers only spend about 1.6 hours per
week. 2 Given the fact that no state has ever fully complied with the
requirements of the IDEA,'2' the ever-increasing paperwork and manpower
required for compliance creates another obstacle for schools and makes it less
likely that school districts will be able to provide adequate specialized services
to all eligible students.
B. Obstacles to Effective Parental Advocacy
Having established that schools, the entities primarily responsible for
formulating IEPs for students, '22 are often conflicted, the adequacy of services
for disabled students turns on the efficacy of parents acting as students'
representatives in the face of school failure.'23
The IDEA follows the general trend in American law of recognizing parents
as the best advocates for their children.' 4 As discussed in Part II, the IDEA
contains multiple procedural safeguards requiring schools to notify parents and
permit their participation at most stages of the process, including
identification, evaluation, and development of an TEP. Additionally, the statute
allows parents to request due process hearings in front of a neutral hearing
mg. Id. at 36.
12o. Nancy Lee Jones & Richard N. Apling, The Individuals with Disabilities Act, in INDMDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 99-1OO (Nancy Lee
Jones, Richard N. Apling & David P. Smole eds., 2004).
121. Barnes, supra note 1io, at 6. Although the IDEA represents the overarching federal special
education law, each state provides its own requirements for special education programs
either through legislation or regulation. State statutes or regulations are necessary in order
to implement IDEA requirements within state-specific educational structures. In some cases,
states may also choose to impose higher educational standards than the IDEA. In the case of
California, however, the state legislature clearly stated that "nothing in this [statute] shall be
construed to set a higher standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than that
established by Congress under the [IDEA]." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56000 (West 2003).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) ("(S]tates, local educational agencies, and
educational service agencies are primarily responsible for providing an education for all
children with disabilities .... ").
123. See Stanley S. Herr, Child Advocacy in Special Education, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILDREN?
THE HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CHILD ADVOCACY 147, 159 (Jack C. Westman ed.,
1991) ("Recognizing advocacy functions as a major role of parenting, federal law vests
parents with ongoing responsibilities for approving IEPs, authorizing evaluations, and
challenging questionable special-education decisions.").
124. See supra Part I.
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officer if they feel the school is not providing a free and appropriate education
for their child. 2 These procedural safeguards are the IDEA's main check on
schools, to which the federal government delegates responsibility for
interpreting the substantive requirements for special education. Without any
rubric of success, the IDEA relies heavily on the parent-school team to produce
just outcomes for students receiving special education services.126 It is clear that
the IDEA was formulated on the presumption that parents are both willing and
able to perform these necessary functions.'1
2
While in many ways parents can act as valuable representatives for their
children, there are three barriers to parental advocacy in the realm of special
education. All of these barriers arise from the Act's unstated presumption that
parents have sufficient knowledge to advocate effectively for their child. First,
while parents may be better at identifying their child's strengths and
weaknesses than school officials, parents are unlikely to be able to classify their
child's abilities according to recognized diagnostic criteria for disabilities.
Second, while parents may readily notice what is and is not working in an
established remedial program, most parents do not have experience working
within an educational system and are unaware of the educational options and
services available to a disabled child in a public school. Third, parents must be
able to interface with school officials and navigate the multiple procedural
requirements of the IDEA in order to challenge a school's decision. In most
125. 20 U.S.C. § 141 5 (f)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
126. The statute's emphasis on procedural protections for parents suggests that it envisioned the
schools and parents to be in a cooperative relationship in the special education context and
assumed that parents would take responsibility for challenging inappropriate or inadequate
provision of services. See H.R. REp. No. 104-614, at 5 (1996) (stressing the importance of
"very detailed" procedural safeguards to protect parents and children); S. RsPL. No. 94-168,
at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 (articulating the necessity to "provide
procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are
guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and
educational placement of handicapped children").
127. In addition to presuming that parents have the requisite knowledge to advocate for their
children, the IDEA also assumes that parents are willing to make the extra effort to
participate in the special education process. There are certainly families in which, for
whatever reason, the parent will not be sufficiently motivated to fight for a FAPE for his
child. This Note, however, focuses on those cases where the parent is willing, but simply
unable, to advocate effectively. In the most extreme cases of abuse or neglect, a child will be
assigned a parent surrogate. 20 U.S.C. § 14 15 (b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). When a
surrogate is involved, this Note's discussion about the necessity of supplemental advocacy
will still apply. Pure parental unwillingness, however, would not be remedied by parental
supplementation. In considering policy options, see infra Part TV, several ideas are suggested
for implementing an ancillary parental supplantation program designed to serve children
whose parents are unwilling to participate in the educational decision-making process.
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cases, interacting with school officials requires parents to challenge someone
with expert knowledge about education and to do so while maintaining
relationships which will continue for the duration of the child's time in public
school. In addition, the IDEA imposes extensive procedural requirements that
can constitute a significant obstacle to effective advocacy."' For example, in
Virginia a parent who wants an independent evaluation of his or her child must
make a formal request to the school district. If the parent would like the
independent evaluation to be done at public expense, she may have to appear at
a due process hearing and present evidence proving that the child needs to be
evaluated by a third party. 9
1. Lack of Knowledge About Disability
Although parents may be aware of the existence of common disabilities, it
is unreasonable to assume that they have knowledge of the symptoms of these
disabilities or can place their child's symptoms within a diagnostic category.
For example, a parent might recognize that a child has more difficulty learning
to read than his peers, but she probably will not be able to label that difficulty
as a learning disability, autism, or attention deficit disorder. A parent might
even attribute the child's difficulties with reading and other tasks to poor
instruction in school or merely to slow learning. Without a diagnosis of some
sort, a child cannot receive special education. Recall the earlier discussion of
Jeremy's story: when neither schools nor parents identify a child as having a
disability, he receives no targeted services at all.
It is important to note that in order to diagnose a child with a disability
schools are required to employ "trained and knowledgeable personnel" to
evaluate the child using a number of different tests. 3 ' Unless the parent is a
professional who has worked with children with disabilities, it is unreasonable
to expect her to recognize a specific disability through her own analysis.
Because parents do not usually have the requisite knowledge to act as a proxy
for schools when officials fail to identify a child as having special needs, the
IDEA procedural safeguard of parent referral does not adequately meet its goal.
128. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the ModerniPostmodern Search for the
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999, lOO (1988) ("In addition to the psychological
burdens of coping with a handicapped child, most parents lack the information and the
resources to deal with the school bureaucracy. Both participation in the meetings and
consent to the placement are usually formalities only.").
129. See Div. OF SPEcIAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., supra note 4, at 7.
130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(iv) (2007).
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In some cases, children will encounter another type of professional who
should be able to diagnose a disability. For example, a child who has cerebral
palsy will be diagnosed shortly after birth. Children with other physically-
manifesting disabilities will likely be diagnosed in the course of pediatrician
visits. Mental, emotional, and behavioral disabilities, however, may not be
noticed during the provision of medical care. These are also the types of
disabilities that are much more difficult for parents to recognize due to
nonphysical manifestations.
2. Lack of Knowledge of Educational Options
Since the IDEA "envisions active parents responsible for approving IEPs,
authorizing evaluations, and challenging questionable education decisions,'
131
it is important to discuss the actual extent of the average parent's
understanding of the educational system. Most of our parenting skills are
developed either through trial-and-error or personal experience. A blend of
experience and instinct is in most situations enough to prepare a parent to act
in his child's best interest. Nonetheless, it seems counterintuitive to require
parents to act as representatives for children in situations involving something
as important and complex as special education without providing relevant
training.
Education is a commonly shared experience, and most parents are able to
draw on their own experiences to form expectations of teachers and school
systems. However, special education involves complex, specialized services,
with which few parents have any experience. For this reason, students
receiving special education services bear the risk of being poorly served by their
parents. Given that disability is a widely varying condition which each
individual experiences uniquely, it is quite probable that a parent may not be
the most appropriate advocate.'32
Since the passage of the IDEA, multiple scholars have argued that parents
are often not filly aware of educational options available for their children and
therefore have a difficult time forming accurate expectations of schools and
teachers.'33 This lack of clarity about expectations is also symptomatic of many
131. Herr, supra note 16, at 366.
132. See id. at 374 ("Many parents lack the training or support to perform the role of child
advocate, educational decision-maker, and program evaluator." (citing Deborah A. Allen &
Suzanne Stefanowski Hudd, Are We Professionalizing Parents? Weighing the Benefits and
Pitfalls, 25 MENTAL RETARDATION 133 (1987))).
133. MILTON BUDOFF, ALAN ORENSTEIN & CAROL KERVICK, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION:
ON GOING TO A HEARING 251-52 (1982); ANNETrE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS,
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parents' view that education is exclusively the domain of schools, and that
educators are singularly capable of determining what a child needs in an
educational environment.13 4 For many parents, it is unclear what level of
comprehension their child should be achieving at any point during a school
year. 3 Such uncertainty contributes to the default assumptions that schools
are doing their jobs and that interference is unnecessary. This barrier is very
difficult to overcome for most parents because it requires them to realize the
importance of their role as advocates for their children and as partners with the
school in special education proceedings. Documented "educator resentment" of
parental contribution to decisions about IEPs is an additional barrier faced by
parents. 6 When confronted with officials who do not welcome parental
contributions, parents must take the extra step of convincing the experts on
education that they are qualified participants.
Compounding this gap in knowledge of educational options is the fact that
the special education regime involves not only the text of the IDEA, but also
federal regulations, state statutes and regulations, and judicial decisions.' 37
Moreover, the notice provided to parents does not clearly illuminate the
various substantive requirements for schools and the reasoning behind those
policies. As noted in Part II, the IDEA does not provide an educational "menu"
specifying what course of action should be taken for each child with each type
of disability. Most parents do not understand why it might be disadvantageous
to a child to be in a separate special education class for the entire day or that
schools must follow disciplinary guidelines for children with IEPs. Therefore,
although the IDEA offers certain procedural protections to parents in the form
RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 198-99 (2003); William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political
Method of Evaluating the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several
Gaps of Gap Analysis, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 7, 33; Engel, supra note 49,
at 179.
134. See infra Subsection TII.B. 3 .
13S. Kotler, supra note 48, at 372-73 (discussing parental inability to judge or compare outcomes
in educational programming).
136. Id. at 363 ("Educator resentment of parental participation in the process of selecting and
implementing educational programming for disabled children is well documented." (citing
Roland K. Yoshida et al., Parental Involvement in the Special Education Pupil Planning Process:
The School's Perspective, 44 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 531, 533 (1978))).
137. Herr, supra note 16, at 368-69 ("[Special education] advocates must ... be fluent in the
complex federal and state statutes, regulations, policies, and judicial opinions that support
the student's entitlement to a FAPE and the remedies for any violations of the student's
statutory and constitutional rights.").
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of brochures and notifications about [EP meetings, parents are not well-
equipped to deal with the substance of their child's educational needs.' 38
Thus, the procedural safeguard allowing parents to participate in IEP team
meetings and challenge IEP decisions is not very effective if parents are
unaware of alternative options for educational programming. In the anecdote
about Adam, it is clear that if his mother had not been aware that he was
entitled to additional time on tests and that there was an option to retake the
test after the initial oversight had been made, she might not have attempted to
convince his teacher to give him the test for a second time.
3. Difficulty in Interfacing with School Officials and Complying with
Procedural Requirements
Many parents have difficulty navigating the personal interactions and
procedural requirements involved in challenging a school's special education
determination. This gap in parental ability may stem from an inability to
interface effectively with authority figures. As discussed briefly above, the
current structure of public education encourages parents to defer on issues of
special education, largely because parents who send their children to public
schools139 often delegate decision making on questions of curriculum,
evaluation, and behavior to school officials. 14' This pattern of deference
impedes parental participation in IEP meetings or due process hearings
138. See Engel, supra note 49, at 179 (describing the findings of a study which show that parents
are usually unaware of "the extent of their children's substantive educational rights").
139. This Note has focused on problems of special education within public schools, because
private schools often have more extensive funding and are better able to provide students
with costly services. Nonetheless, many parents who send their children to private schools
likely experience the same difficulty in obtaining sufficient knowledge to advocate for their
children. The benefits of external advocacy discussed in Part IV of this Note would be
equally applicable in private school contexts.
140. See, e.g., BUDOFF ET AL., supra note 133, at 251 (stating that hearing officers report that during
due process hearings "parents, who are usually not experts in education, might perceive the
opposing school as more powerful, more experienced with hearings, and more
knowledgeable than themselves"); Herr, supra note j6, at 366 ("Unfortunately, parental
participation is often limited because of excessive parental deference to professional
educational judgment .. "); Kotler, supra note 48, at 361 ("[T]he belief that educators have
superior knowledge regarding programming, may lead to deference [by parents] to their
decisions.").
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because parents have not developed the requisite language to discuss
educational programming with "expert" school personnel. 1 41
Carol Vincent and Jane Martin conducted a study attempting to explain
parental inability to interface effectively with school personnel. They describe
two models of interaction with "expert systems" such as public schools: "The
social democratic emphasis on the specialist knowledge of professional service
deliverers created the public as clients ... characterized by passivity ....
[N]eoliberalism has sought to turn the public domain into a market in which
the public exercise competitive consumer choice."'' 42 If the exercise of such
consumer choice were not dependent upon the requisite linguistic abilities (i.e.,
the ability to understand educational jargon) and the capacity to navigate
formal rules imposed by legislation and regulation at both the state and federal
levels, parents would be much more effective advocates. Vincent and Martin go
on to discuss varying parental interactions with public schools in terms of
capital. They argue that "possession and deployment of material (i.e. goods
and finances), social (networks and relationships), and cultural (knowledge
and skills, social confidence) capital were vital in explaining variations in
parents' expression of voice."' 43 Parents who were effective advocates had much
more knowledge about education in general and interfaced well with authority
figures. 1" For parents who participated less in the educational process, many
felt as if their intervention would not produce meaningful change, and some
expressed the sentiment that parent-teacher conferences are "not for 'people
like us.""141 If the system now requires parents to make smart, consumer-like
decisions, those without the requisite material, social, and cultural capital are at
a marked disadvantage in their role as advocates for their children. 1 6
141. LAREAu, supra note 133, at 199; Engel, supra note 49, at 194 ("[Parents] are often less
educated than other [participants] and are non-conversant in the technical language or
concepts used during the meeting.").
142. Carol Vincent & Jane Martin, Class, Culture, and Agency: Researching Parental Voice, 23
DISCOURSE 109,110 (2002).
143. Id. at 113.
144. Id. at 115.
145. Id. at 122.
146. In another article, Carol Vincent writes:
There are common sense assumptions concerning the interrelationship between
social class and parental agency: that an individual's sense of agency and not just
agency in regard to education, is heavily structured by social class; that
opportunities for exercising agency are sought and taken up mostly by the
professional middle-classes, secure in a sense of entitlement. These, then, are the
people most capable of and most effective at challenging "expert systems."
Carol Vincent, Social Class and Parental Agency, 16 J. EDUC. POL'Y 347, 348 (2001).
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Professor David Engel analyzed a 1988-1989 study that found that parents
feel inadequate and unqualified in special education situations across
socioeconomic and other demographic classes.' 47 He reported the following
about parental participation in IEP meetings:
Most parents describe themselves as terrified and inarticulate. Some
liken themselves to prisoners awaiting their sentence, and this
courtroom imagery emphasizes their perception of the judgmental
rather than cooperative quality of the decisionmaking as well as their
feelings of vulnerability and disempowerment.... Often, but not
always, parents feel that their own observations or requests are given
little weight and that decisions are based primarily on the
recommendations of the professionals. Their own close relationship
with the child is viewed as a liability rather than as an asset -a liability
that renders their judgments inherently suspect. Some committee
chairpersons described with consternation the tendency of the majority
of parents to stop attending the annual review meetings after the first
few years. Non-attendance is predictable, however, in light of the
stress, frustration, and anger expressed by parents in one interview
after another. 145
The concept of "educator resentment" described in Subsection III.B.2 is
another factor frustrating parental ability to interface effectively with school
officials. Professor Engel reports that "[p]arents are inherently suspect because
of their emotional attachment to the child, and [IEP team] members assume
that parental preferences reflect subjective rather than objective judgments.' 49
A study by Professors William Clune and Mark Van Pelt revealed that this
"educator resentment" ' has led to "IEP conferences [that] frequently are
highly formal, noninteractive, and replete with educational jargon.""'' Other
studies have shown that, more often than not, school personnel make decisions
about educational programming before IEP meetings, thereby preventing any
meaningful parental input.' 2
147. See Engel, supra note 49, at 168 n.6, 188.
148. Id. at 188-89.
149. Id. at 194.
i5o. Kotler, supra note 48, at 363.
151. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 133, at 33.
152. Handler, supra note 128, at lO ("Parents are usually presented with staff
recommendations, followed by ritualistic certification.").
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Over the last few years, the Supreme Court has heard several cases relating
to parental involvement in IEP decisions and other special education
proceedings. While the Court expanded parental rights in one case, I"3 it
restricted parents' ability to advocate for their children under the IDEA in two
cases heard during the October 20o5 Term. s4 In its decision in Schaffer v.
Weast, the Court held that the burden of proof in an IDEA due process hearing
initiated by parents seeking relief for their child is properly placed on the
parents rather than the school district. ' s In what is already a complicated and
difficult process, parents must now attempt to gather evidence to satisfy their
burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP. In her dissent
in Schaffer, Justice Ginsburg recognized the almost insurmountable burden
placed on parents by the Court, writing that "the school district is ... in a far
better position to demonstrate that it has fulfilled its [statutory obligation]
than the disabled student's parents are in to show that the school district has
failed to do so. ' '1"6 The second case the Court considered was Arlington v.
Murphy, wherein the Court held that parents who prevail under an IDEA suit
against a school district are not entitled to recover fees for services rendered by
nonattorney experts." 7 This decision increased the already prohibitive costs of
litigating a special education claim and will doubtlessly prevent many parents
without extensive financial resources from filing complaints against school
districts. The Arlington decision, when considered in conjunction with the
Court's holding in Schaffer, which places the evidentiary burden on parents,
"ignore[s] the realities of the litigation process and the characteristics of many
153. The parents of an autistic student sued a school district under the IDEA to challenge what
they perceived to be inadequate provision of services in the student's IEP. The Sixth Circuit
held that parents could not prosecute an IDEA claim pro se because they did not have
standing and therefore could not proceed without representation. The Supreme Court
reversed and held that parents were entitled to rights under the IDEA and therefore could
prosecute IDEA claims. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007)
(abrogating Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005);
Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998)).
154. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 245, 2463 (2006); Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005). For a full discussion of the impact of Arlington and Schaffer on
special education policy, see Thomason, supra note 74.
155. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
156. Id. at 64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cit.
2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting)); see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir.
1993); Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 5 6o A.2d ii8o, 1188-89 (N.J. 1989).
157. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
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special education parents by imposing unreasonable obstacles in the way of
parents' attempts to exercise their due process rights. ''1s
Up to this point, this Note has focused on ensuring adequacy of special
education services across the board. Distributional concerns facing consumers
of special education are inextricably intertwined with broader adequacy
considerations and must be considered in a discussion of parental advocacy. To
that effect, it is important to note that the risk factors faced by many children
with disabilities compound the problem of the three gaps discussed above.
Some of these risk factors include poverty, greater likelihood of experiencing
abuse, social isolation, and problems obtaining medical care. For example,
twenty-eight percent of children with disabilities live in households with
incomes below the poverty line, as opposed to only sixteen percent of
nondisabled children.Y9 Evidence suggests that during the 198os and 1990s,
the prevalence of disability in the United States increased, but only among
families living below the poverty line. 6 With respect to child abuse, one
"conservative" estimate suggested that disabled children are abused almost
twice as often as nondisabled children. 6 These risk factors suggest that
parents of disabled students are much more likely to have difficulty advocating
effectively for their children, perhaps because their impoverishment forces
parents to work more jobs and spend more time outside the home, or because
abusive parents may be less likely to have an interest in the child's success at
school. 162 Additionally, those families living below the poverty line on average
have achieved lower levels of education than middle-class families. This
socioeconomic reality enlarges the gaps in parents' knowledge and ability. To
the extent that disability is more likely to occur in certain disadvantaged
communities, parents in these communities may need additional support to
effectively advocate for their child. Without some sort of low-cost or no-cost
supplemental advocacy program, many of these parents will not have the
1s8. Thomason, supra note 74, at 476.
1S9. Susan L. Parish & Alison I. Whisnant, Policies and Programs for Children and Youth with
Disabilities, in SOCIAL POLICY FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES: A RISK AND RESILIENCE
PERSPECTIVE 167, 170 (Jeffrey M. Jenson & Mark W. Fraser eds., 2006).
16o. Id.
161. Id. at 171.
162. See BUDOFF ET AL., supra note 133, at 252 ("Hearing officers [at due process hearings] noted
that ... the parents bringing cases were mainly well educated, affluent, suburban parents.
They felt that as urban parents were not able to afford representation; they were more easily
intimidated by the requirements of a hearing and thus far less able to assert their rights
under the law.").
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financial resources to seek extra help, and children facing school failures will
suffer as a result of ineffective advocacy.
It is a great disservice to children with special education needs to presume
that their parents are adequately prepared to advocate for them and to
represent their best interests when the schools do not. The United States has
long considered education to be a social priority, and such an important social
institution should receive heightened procedural protections. By passing such a
broad statute as the IDEA, Congress seemed to recognize that the stakes
surrounding education, and particularly special education, are extraordinarily
high. Despite the fact that amendments to the IDEA have clearly admitted the
statute's failures (albeit in vague language), 6 ' no steps toward providing
supplemental advocacy have been taken. 164 Part IV suggests several possibilities
for pilot programs that could help fill in gaps in parental knowledge and
improve the quality of advocacy available to children.
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO SUPPLEMENT INADEQUATE PARENTAL
ADVOCACY
Having established that the procedural protections laid out by the IDEA do
not always offer a sufficient safeguard against school failure,16, this Part
explores the various forms that third-party assistance for parents might take.
A. Models of Policy Analysis: Parental Supplementation vs. Parental
Supplantation
As a preliminary exercise, it is useful to consider external assistance at a
conceptual level as either parental supplantation or parental supplementation.
Parental supplantation involves a model where an external advocate would
completely replace the parent in all special education proceedings such as JEP
163. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) ("[T]he implementation of [the IDEA] has
been impeded by low expectations, and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research
on proven methods of teaching and learning for children with disabilities.").
164. This is true despite the fact that many scholars have recognized the need for such
supplemental advocacy. See BUDOFF ET AL., supra note 133, at 251; Handler, supra note 128, at
io11; Herr, supra note 123, at 151; Herr, supra note 16, at 367-68.
165. Herr, supra note 123, at 151 ("Even the most conscientious and zealous parents may need the
aid and advice of a professional child advocate to claim the services due their child....
[P]arents often require access to professional advocates to help them understand their
rights, to allow them to participate effectively in the Individualized Education Plan (IEP)
process . . ").
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meetings and due process hearings. The supplantation would effectively give
the student a parent "surrogate," which the IDEA requires for students whose
parents cannot be located by the state agency and for students who are wards
of the state.' 66 Parental supplementation, on the other hand, creates a
cooperative relationship between the parent and the external advocate to work
with the school on all special education matters. This Section uses the guardian
ad litem system as an example of parental supplantation, and early childhood
intervention programs and family intervention teams as examples of parental
supplementation.
In most legal matters involving children, parents are the default
representative for their child. Unless "it appears that the minor's general
representative has interests which may conflict with those of the person he is
supposed to represent," courts assume parents are competent
representatives. 6 7 In Connecticut, as in the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions,
the legislature has declared a child's parent to be his or her de facto guardian.'68
It is important to note, however, that the legal system does recognize
certain situations wherein it is necessary to supplant parents and appoint a
separate representative for a child. These situations usually involve matters
where the judicial system is attempting to minimize a potential conflict of
interest between parents and children.' 69 An example of a type of
representative used to supplant parents is a guardian ad litem, a guardian
appointed to represent the interests of a child (or a person who is otherwise
incapable of representing themselves) in a single litigation. A guardian ad litem
does not act as an attorney, although in some cases a child's attorney can also
be his guardian ad litem. Trial courts are generally given broad discretion to
determine whether or not a guardian ad litem should be appointed 17' and may
appoint one sua sponte.' 7'
Examples of situations where courts often supplant parents are custody
proceedings ,172 paternity determinations, 73  and divorce proceedings, 74
166. See 20 U.S.C. § 14 15 (b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
167. Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285 (lst Cir. 1982) (citing
Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5 th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-6o6 (2007).
169. Shockley v. Okeke, 882 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (stating that guardians ad
litem are to be appointed if a parent's interests are potentially incompatible with those of the
child).
170. In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d 796, 802 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
1-1. Shockley, 882 A.2d at 1248.
172. G.S. v. T.S., 582 A.2d 467, 470 (Conn. App. Ct. 199o) (citing Yontefv. Yontef, 44o A.2d
899, 904 (Conn. 1981) ("[I]n the absence of strong countervailing considerations such as
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proceedings involving the disbursement of a child's trust fund,'75 any instance
where a child has an interest in an insurance policy or other benefit,,76 or any
situation where conflict exists between a minor and a state agency. 177 Since
1974, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) has
conditioned the disbursement of CAPTA grants on the existence of a state law
requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem "in every case involving an
abused or neglected child that results in a judicial proceeding.'178
In all of these cases, parental supplantation is required because there is the
potential for the parent's interest to conflict directly with the child's. In these
cases, as opposed to other contexts, discussed in Part I, parents are not able to
represent their child in good faith. It is not a question of a parent not having
the capacity to represent her child, but rather that the parent could potentially
allow his or her interests to supersede those of the child. As another example,
in situations involving money, such as a trust fund, there is the potential for
self-dealing by parents, who may have selfish motives in making decisions
regarding the child's economic livelihood. In terms of special education,
however, the potential for self-dealing disappears because the parent is unlikely
to benefit personally from the disbursement of benefits.
While the model of parental supplantation is useful as a third-party
participation model, it is not particularly useful in the realm of special
education. If parents are supplanted, the child will lose the benefit of those
functions that are best served by a parent. Parents have unique knowledge of
their children's needs and abilities, and they have the requisite motivation,
presumably cultivated by the intimacy of the parent-child relationship, to
advocate on their children's behalf. Therefore, while the model of parental
supplantation might be useful in some aspects of a child's interaction with state
institutions, it seems clear that parents with good intentions but imperfect
physical urgency or financial stringency, the better course is to appoint independent counsel
whenever the issue of child custody is seriously contested.")).
173. UN1F. PARENTAGE ACT § 612(b), 9B U.L.A. 345 (2000) (requiring the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in court proceedings determining a child's paternity). Some states have
stated that a child's mother may not serve in this capacity. See, e.g., Ernest P. v. Superior
Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Ct. App. 1980).
174. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 216 N.W.2d 176 (Neb. 1974).
175. See Tremaine v. Tremaine, No. D.N. FA 86-0038193 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 13 (Jan. 4,
1991); Sarron v. Sarron, 564 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 199o); Waukesha County v.
Tadych, 541 N.W.2d 782 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
176. See, e.g., Hock v. Lienco Cedar Prods., 634 P.2d 1174 (Mont. 1981); Turner v. Turner, 629
N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
,77. 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 12:4, at 888 (rev. 2d ed. 2005).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 51o6a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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knowledge and ability should not be entirely supplanted in the context of
special education.
The conclusion that parental supplantation is not the best approach in the
context of special education is based on the assumption that parents will be
willing to contribute their time and efforts to achieve optimal educational
outcomes for their children. Of course, this assumption does not always hold
true. For example, since the IDEA requires schools to obtain a parent's
informed consent before initiating an evaluation,7 9 a parent who simply does
not respond essentially prevents her child from receiving any specialized
services at all. In the case of a parent who refuses to provide consent for an
evaluation, or who does not respond to a request for consent, the school
district may request a due process hearing to pursue the matter."s As discussed
in Part III, however, the requirements to request a due process hearing can be
tedious, and school districts will not be in violation of the IDEA's requirements
if they fail to pursue their request in the absence of parental consent."' In cases
of parental unwillingness to participate, there is no question that children
could benefit from an advocate outside parents and school districts. While
supplantation would deprive children with participating parents of important
benefits, this method would be well-suited, and even necessary, to assist
children whose parents will not give them a voice.
As an alternative to parental supplantation, an advocate could supplement
parents by working with them to fill gaps in knowledge and ability in order to
provide the child with adequate representation. These cases generally do not
involve conflicts of interest between a parent and a child, and as such they
share more similarities with special education disputes than do cases involving
guardians ad litem. Supplementation is a tool most often used to fill in gaps in
parents' knowledge or in their ability to serve as advocates. Two useful models
for this type of supplemental representation are state programs for infants and
toddlers and intervention teams within child welfare programs.
Many states have programs targeting intervention for infants and toddlers
with developmental delays in the hope of warding off any learning or other
type of disability before the child reaches school-age. For many of the same
reasons discussed in Part III, parents may not be well-equipped to identify and
provide treatment for children with developmental delays. South Carolina, for
179. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
18o. Id. §§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I), 141 5(b)(6).
181. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(III).
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example, has a program called BabyNet,182 the purpose of which is to "provide
early intervention services for all eligible infants and toddlers with disabilities
and their families. ""13 Recognizing the great value of parental input in the
evaluation and treatment of infants with developmental delays, the policy also
requires the development of Individualized Family Service Plans, which "must
be developed by a multidisciplinary team of appropriate qualified personnel
which also must include the parent, guardian, or other adult responsible for the
child. '1 84 In this way, professionals with expertise in identifying and treating
early childhood developmental problems supplement parents, and the gaps in
knowledge are filled.
Another example of parental supplementation is Virginia's system for
intervention in troubled families under the Comprehensive Services Act.'
58
This program operates outside the school system and devises behavioral plans
and other remedial services in an effort to prevent the placement of children in
foster care or another nonfamily placement. It utilizes a Family Assessment and
Planning Team, which "[p]rovide[s] for family participation in all aspects of
assessment, planning and implementation of services.',, 86 Here, the value of
parental inclusion in the process comes from both the parent's input and the
opportunity to train the parent so that he or she may implement the behavioral
program devised by the team.
Similarly, it is essential for parents to participate closely in the evaluation
and remediation process for students receiving special education services.
Parents can act as advocates in ways that an external advocate or representative
never could. Therefore, this Note will use the model of parental
supplementation in considering potential programs.1
87
182. See S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, Children with Special Health Care Needs:
BabyNet, http://www.scdhec.gov/health/mch/cshcn/programs/babynet/ (last visited Mar.
3, 2008).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-2540 (2002).
184. Id. § 44-7-2560.
18s. Comprehensive Services Act for At-Risk Youth and Families, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-5200 to
-5214 (2005 & 2007 Supp.).
186. Id. § 2.2-5208.
187. Again, this conclusion is based on the assumption that parents are willing to participate in
special education decisions for their child. In cases where parents are unwilling to
participate, parental supplementation would be ineffective. The following discussion of
policy options will mention various ways in which proposals might be modified to serve
children whose parents will not serve as their advocates.
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B. Policy Proposals
In imagining a model for third-party assistance, this Note employs three
important criteria: access, accountability, and funding. There are any number
of ways to conceptualize each individual criterion, and any number of
combinations that could result from considering the three together. The drastic
demographic variations among school districts suggest that no single policy
will be effective across the board, but by discussing the various components of
a policy, it becomes possible to tailor a program to the specific needs of a school
district.
As with all forms of policy analysis, multiple criteria are available to the
critic. In the case of special education, however, access, accountability, and
funding are the most relevant. Both access and accountability play into the
concerns about the adequacy of special education. Thinking back to Jeremy's
story, the major concern was that Jeremy was never evaluated and therefore
was ineligible to receive special education services under the IDEA. If our
concern is that school districts may not identify eligible children in a timely
manner, then any program of supplemental advocacy must consider whether it
can be effective in the face of a school's failure to evaluate. The access point,
where an advocate begins to work with the parents and the school, will
determine whether or not the advocate will be able to alleviate the problem of
identification. In terms of accountability, a major concern discussed in Part III
is that parents will not have the necessary knowledge or ability to challenge a
school's decisions about a child's educational programming, and therefore the
school is not held accountable in the way the IDEA imagined. If a supplemental
advocacy program adds an external advocate to the parent-school team, there
should be some accountability mechanism so that the shortcomings of an
external advocate will not disadvantage a child. Finally, in the wake of a
backlash from state governments and citizen groups against unfunded federal
mandates, 8 no education policy, and specifically no special education policy, 89
can neglect to discuss funding concerns while still claiming any type of
legitimacy.
In considering how consumers would access external advocacy, the central
question is: at what point in the process should parents and students receive an
88. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Some School Districts Challenge Bush's Signature Education Law, N.Y.
TMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at Ai; William Yardley, School Financing Is Focus of Lawsuit in
Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at B6 (referring to a lawsuit filed by the Connecticut
Attorney General which described the No Child Left Behind Act as an "unfunded
mandate").
18q. See supra Part III.
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external advocate? Such a determination is necessary to set the parameters of
the program and to define who qualifies to use the service. As an illustration of
access points, consider the model of a public defender's office. This model
provides a logical access point: when you are charged with a crime, you are
provided with representation. People do not have access to public defenders
before they commit the crime and cannot therefore solicit legal advice at that
point. The access point clearly defines the parameters of the service. The
system of special education is not as clear-cut as the criminal justice system,
with several viable access points to consider. One option would be to provide
an advocate only when a parent, teacher, or other party has made a formal
request that a child be evaluated. This approach would prevent the
overprovision or abuse of the service, in that parents who do not have reason to
believe that their child has a disability would not have access to this resource. It
would not, however, address one of the major concerns discussed in Part III:
parents are not always aware that they have a right to request an evaluation,
and they are not always able to identify indications that an assessment would
be useful.
Rather than using a child's identification as the access point for an external
advocacy program, another option would be to provide space within the school
where parents could go to request services. This approach would mimic a
guidance counselor's office, which is available to any parent or student who
wishes to use it. Parents could go to this office to discuss concerns about a
child's academic performance and to receive neutral, expert advice as to
whether or not they should affirmatively request an evaluation. This option,
however, creates the possibility of overprovision or abuse of services.
Unnecessary requests for representation could deplete limited resources. The
establishment of a thirty-day trial period, during which advocates could meet
with students and determine their need for supplemental advocacy, could stem
any abuse of services.
Access points would also be a critical component of any policy designed to
protect children whose parents are unwilling to participate. The only effective
access point would be the point at which the parent's unwillingness becomes
obvious to school officials, which in most cases would occur at the initial
request for an evaluation. At this point, one option would be to institute a
policy requiring the school district to request parental permission to refer the
child to an external advocate. Parents who refuse to respond in the first
instance, however, are similarly unlikely to sign a waiver. Any other method,
such as sharing the names of non-participating parents with an external
advocacy agency, would violate confidentiality requirements and frustrate
parental rights. A more practical solution to this difficult problem seems to be
legislative: states could enact legislation that goes beyond the requirements of
1843
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the IDEA. For example, states could require schools to request due process
complaints in cases where parents fail to respond, or enact provisions for
guardians ad litem to be appointed for children whose parents refuse to
participate in decision-making about the child's education.
Second, structures of accountability are important to monitor the quality of
services provided by an external advocacy program. An advocate providing
unsatisfactory services does not benefit children and their parents or school
districts. Any policy should implement mechanisms both to ensure that the
advocates they hire are qualified and to replace advocates whose representation
is substandard. The sponsor of an external advocacy program would have to
decide who hires advocates and to whom the advocates are accountable. The
most basic approach would be to allow the state to hire advocates or recruit
volunteers who have existing expertise in special education, or who would
receive specialized training in order to serve as effective advocates. In order to
guarantee that the advocate acts only in the best interests of the child and
maintains neutrality in disagreements between parents and school officials, a
program should recruit people from professions with strong ethical guidelines,
so that the person would feel more allegiance to professional standards than to
any other pressures from the school or parents. For example, if a school district
employed attorneys as external advocates, they would nonetheless be bound by
some version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.19 Neutrality,
however, does not guarantee quality. A policy program could solve this
problem by passing accountability directly to parents. For example, a program
could allow parents to hire their own external advocate on a reimbursement
basis. An even more attractive program, in terms of equality and accessibility,
would be to provide parents with vouchers to hire advocates. These advocates
would be entirely accountable to the parents, and if the parents were displeased
with the advocate's performance, they could fire the person and request
another voucher. To prevent consumers from requesting new vouchers when
advocates, in good faith, do not achieve the desired results, a program could
require a parent to show cause for the termination of the advocate.
If a policy were enacted where schools hired advocates directly, it would be
important to create a mechanism for consumers, meaning parents and
students, to complain if the advocate does not do a good job. This could take
the form of an ad hoc committee to review complaints whenever necessary,
19o. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007). Although the rules themselves are not binding,
forty-seven states have adopted some version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and made them binding upon lawyers practicing in those states. See Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha-states.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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although the neutrality of the committee, or lack thereof, might still be cause
for concern.
Yet another option would be to create space within the school for a
nonprofit organization to serve as external advocates for students. This
approach would ensure neutrality from the school district, but the limited
financial and human resources of nonprofit organizations might pose a
challenge. Advocates provided by a nonprofit organization could also be held
accountable by an ad hoc committee to which consumers could make
complaints. Depending on the funding of such a program, it is conceivable that
if a nonprofit organization employed advocates who provided low quality
services, funding could be transferred to a more competent organization.
Accountability in a parental supplantation program for children without
participating parents presents a more difficult problem. Since parents are not
available to hold advocates accountable, the burden falls to the school. There is
a potential conflict of interest here, since an advocate's substandard
representation may stem from the fact that he inappropriately deferred to a
school's decision. A monitoring committee could also be used here, but it
would serve a different function. The group could, for example, audit cases of
parental supplantation to ensure the quality of the advocacy. Advocates who
are underperforming could be replaced, and such auditing would impose
sufficient pressure to encourage higher quality work.
Third, funding constitutes the largest obstacle for a program providing
external advocacy for special education. Possible funding options are federal or
state government, or nongovernmental organizations offering grants to groups
proposing special education initiatives. If a policy were implemented as an
amendment to the IDEA, the federal government could allocate additional
funding to external advocacy programs, while allowing agencies (either at the
state or local level) to determine which elements of the policy proposals
presented here would be most effective in their schools. The biggest concern
with reliance on funding through the IDEA is the government's poor track
record of compliance with statutory funding requirements. An alternative to
requesting that funds be added to the general congressional appropriation for
the IDEA would be to rely on program-specific grants provided by the federal
government. The 2004 reauthorization of and amendments to the IDEA gave
the Secretary of Education the authority to award specific grants to "parent
training and information centers," which are defined as private nonprofit
organizations providing information and various services to parents of disabled
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children.' 9' These grants are completely separate from the formula grants
provided to states and local education agencies under the IDEA. The Secretary
of Education oversees these discretionary grants and is required to provide at
least one grant to a parent training and information center in each state.192 Such
a parent information center could conceivably provide direct advocacy services
to parent consumers.
Alternatively, a supplemental advocacy program could rely on each state to
raise the requisite funds. As discussed in Part III, financial and political
limitations make it difficult to request that states allocate any further funds to
special education. If one or two localities ran particularly effective pilot
programs which proved that external advocacy increases outcomes and
decreases the costs imposed by late identification and misidentification of
children with special needs, the idea of state funding might be realistic.
Finally, the option of applying for grants from nongovernmental
organizations represents another option to procure funding. Many large
organizations provide grants to groups who propose initiatives in areas of
interest to the organization. For example, in 2006 the Chicago Bar Association
provided a grant to a nonprofit called Equip for Equality to fund their Special
Education Advocacy Project, which provided "help-line advice and referral
services, training materials and legal representation to families on critical
special education issues."'93 Although there are significant financial constraints
on organizations providing these grants, seeking funding in this way would
eliminate the political obstacles inherent in any request for governmental
funding.
Funding for new education programs is inevitably a concern for policy
proposals. In the context of disability, proponents of supplemental advocacy
programs such as those described here can improve the political viability of
their proposals by emphasizing the long-term benefits of effective advocacy.
Over time, such programs likely would save money by minimizing the costs of
misidentification and giving teachers the tools efficiently and effectively to help
students with special needs.
191. Pub. L. No. io8-446, § 671(a), 118 Stat. 2647, 2788 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400,
1471 (Supp. IV 2004)). For specific information about applying for these grants, see U.S.
Dep't of Educ., Parental Information and Resource Centers, http://www.ed.gov/programs/
pirc/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 20o8). See also Alison Kepner, Center for Parents Gets
Grant To Expand, NEws J. (Wilmington, Del.), Sept. 2, 2007, at 213.
192. § 671(e)(1)(A), 118 Stat. at 2790.
193. Dina Merrell, The Chicago Bar Foundation: The Community's Foundation for Access to Justice: A
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There are numerous models that could be conceived from the discussion of
access, accountability, and funding. This Note examines three possible
programs and the advantages and drawbacks of each. As with the decision to
choose finite criteria for this analysis, I recognize that there are multiple other
programs that could be conceived in considering a program of supplemental
advocacy for special education. Nonetheless, this Note focuses on three
proposals that employ the criteria differently, and one that has been
implemented successfully in the past. Also, within each proposal, components
could be changed or modified to incorporate any of the above-discussed
approaches to access, accountability, and funding.
1. Policy 1: "Public Defender" Model of Full-Time Advocates
The first proposal draws from the model of a public defender's office. 19 4
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution has long been interpreted to require
the provision of counsel to criminal defendants who cannot afford a lawyer. 'g1
It has become the norm for states to maintain a public defender's office with
full-time attorneys who represent indigent criminal defendants. A similar
model could be applied to special education. Each district could appoint a
special advocate to every child being evaluated for special education services,
and to those already receiving services. This advocate would be a full-time
employee paid by the state and would have pre-existing expertise in the area of
special education. An ad hoc committee, which would accept complaints from
students and parents receiving services, could act as an accountability
mechanism to guarantee high quality advocacy.
A full-time advocate could be recruited from a number of different fields.
One could imagine that the following people might be effective advocates:
attorneys trained in education law, ' 96 retired or former professionals in the
education field, psychologists specializing in learning or other disabilities,
194. In some states, public defenders are private practitioners paid by the state to take individual
cases. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 977.o8(3)(f) (West 2007) ("The state public defender
shall enter into as many annual contracts as possible ... with private local attorneys or law
firms for the provision of legal representation."). The concept here, however, envisions an
office of full-time employees dedicated to representing defendants unable or unwilling to
provide their own defense.
195. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
196. Herr, supra note 16, at 367 ("Legal representation can help parents negotiate a more
favorable IEP or win a contested hearing. Lawyers can use their knowledge to achieve a
legally required outcome that is more beneficial to the child.").
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literacy professionals, or psychoeducational consultants. '9 7 A supplemental
advocacy program could also enhance the advocates' preexisting expertise by
requiring that they complete a training course on special education advocacy. A
number of nonprofit organizations, such as the Federation for Children with
Special Needs,' 98 the Council of Parent Advocates and Attorneys,' 99 and the
Special Needs Advocacy Network200 currently offer such training.
Additionally, a simple Google search reveals that there is currently a large
market for private advocates who assist parents in IEP team meetings and
other special education mattersY.2 ' The state could recruit these individuals to
provide a public service, similar to pro bono services, or their services could be
employed within the private sector through the use of a voucher program.
The advocate would consult with the parent to determine if the child's
current IEP is acceptable and could arrange and attend IEP team meetings to
propose changes and work with the school. In this way, the child would receive
the benefit of his parent's unique knowledge and the expertise of a third-party
advocate. Such a system would overcome the three gaps in parental knowledge
discussed in Part III (lack of knowledge regarding disabilities, educational
options, and difficulty interfacing with school authorities).
Implementing this proposal would require policymakers to overcome some
potential drawbacks. For example, the utilization of the child's evaluation as an
access point to the program does not address the concern that parents do not
always make affirmative requests for evaluation when their children need it.
Additionally, this model would be by far the most expensive of the policies this
Note proposes. To give a rough idea of the funding requirements of this
program, consider the following calculations: in the United States,
approximately fourteen percent of students receive some form of special
education services.2' Even if each advocate could work with fifty students,
such a system would still require about one advocate per five hundred
students. In a school district with five thousand students, the district would
197. Herr, supra note 123, at 151 ("Even the most conscientious and zealous parents may need the
aid and advice of a professional child advocate to claim the services due their child.").
198. Federation for Children with Special Needs, Parent Training and Information, http://fcsn
.org/pti/index.php (last visited Apr. 8, 20o8).
199. Council of Parent Advocates and Attorneys, About COPAA (2007), http://www.copaa.org/
about/index.html.
200. Special Needs Advocacy Network, About Us (2002), http://www.spanmass.org/AboutUs
.html.
zoi. See Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (search for "special education
advocates").
202. SNYDER ET AL., supra note 14, at 81 tbl.5o.
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have to employ about ten special education advocates.2"3 Without discussing
what salary a school district might pay such an advocate, it remains clear that
the cost might be prohibitive.
2. Policy 2: Recruiting and Training Community Volunteers
As an alternative, school districts could adopt the above policy, but could
utilize community volunteers rather than full-time employees. This model has
proven effective in procuring guardians ad litem for children in the judicial
system. Such nonprofits as Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) train
volunteers and coordinate their participation with the judicial system.204 A
well-known example of this type of system is the appointment of private
attorneys to pro bono cases. In both civil and criminal courts, judges are often
given a list of attorneys willing to take pro bono cases of litigants unable to pay
for an attorney on their own. In this way, the state does not assume the cost of
a salary but is still able to provide benefits to those in need." 5
A program utilizing community volunteers as special education advocates
was implemented quite successfully in Madison, Wisconsin, in the 198os. °6
When a child was identified for evaluation, parents were provided with an
easy-to-read handbook about the special education process, including
203. As an alternative, each school district could employ one external advocate to serve all of its
special education students. Such a program would not be desirable, however, because it is
doubtful that such an advocate would be effective if he were carrying the caseload for an
entire school district.
204. See CASA, http://www.nationalcasa.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
205. A serious question with any volunteer program involves the incentives for community
members to volunteer. What might motivate an attorney or a retired teacher to participate?
In order to have a full staff, states would certainly have to make an effort to inform the
community of the problems that exist within special education (limited funding, scarcity of
teachers, etc.) and explain the ways in which they affect disabled children. In order to get
volunteer commitment, however, the community must prioritize the problem. Such
prioritization could perhaps be achieved by recruiting community members to form a task
force on special education. Once a group of people independent of the state valorizes the
issue, the larger community is more likely to care. An interesting strategy would be to
recruit people for the task force from those groups of professionals who might be targeted as
potential volunteer advocates. In this way, those people with the requisite knowledge and
experience would become invested in the issue and would be more likely to volunteer (and
to encourage colleagues to volunteer). Aside from investing the issue of special education
with high priority, the state could provide volunteers with any number of incentives, such as
a small stipend, community events celebrating their work, publicity, etc.
2o6. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BuREAucRAcY 83-119 (1986).
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procedural safeguards for parents and explanations of their substantive and
procedural rights, and encouraged to use a parent advocate. This handbook
also listed community advocates (mostly nonlawyers) willing to assist parents
during IEP meetings with school personnel and other special education
proceedings. This model not only reduced the school-imposed barriers to
parental participation by actually encouraging and facilitating participation,
but also it recognized the gaps in parental ability and knowledge described in
Part III. Professor Handler studied the program in the Madison Metropolitan
School District and reported that the ideology behind the Madison program
viewed parents as a central part of the special education process. As such, the
relationships between parents and school officials were much more productive,
and therefore more conducive to a continuous relationship." 7 Another
interesting aspect of the Madison program was its approach to an access point.
In the 198os, every child who entered the public school system was screened
for possible disability or special needs.2" 8 Although this level of commitment to
special education screening is perhaps not optimal for every school district, it
could reduce the time many students spend struggling through their classes
until an observant teacher refers them for evaluation.
In the model that this Note envisions, community volunteers could
conceivably interact with families in the same way that full-time advocates
could. The aggregate time commitment for each volunteer would necessarily be
smaller to accommodate their other commitments, but recruitment of a larger
number of advocates could counterbalance the part-time commitment.
Accountability would be a serious concern with any type of volunteer
program, since there would be no automatic incentive such as a salary.Y 9 It
would be particularly useful here to shift control to parents and allow them to
request a new advocate if the one assigned to them performs inadequately.
This is a modification of the voucher program discussed earlier, which involves
paid advocates not employed directly by the schools. In this case, the voucher
would represent the right to use a volunteer's services, rather than a voucher
which represents a school's agreement to pay an advocate directly.
207. Id. at 92-93.
2o8. Id. at 85.
2og. The program in Madison, Wisconsin, studied by Professor Joel Handler found great parent
satisfaction with community volunteers serving as supplemental advocates. HANDLER, supra
note 206, at 88-9o. If the pool of community volunteers consists largely of parents and
educators who have firsthand experience with education, Handler suggests that their
commitment to the parents they are serving will be guaranteed by the passion they have for
adequacy and excellence in the provision of special education services. Id. at 92-94.
117: 1802 20o8
EXTERNAL ADVOCACY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION
Funding considerations suggest that a volunteer program would be much
more politically feasible than a program employing full-time paid advocates. A
federal "parent information center" grant, or a local bar association grant,
could provide funds for training and administration of such a program.
Additionally, the involvement of community members could contribute to
social consciousness within the community regarding the existing inadequacies
of special education.
3. Policy 3: Parent Advocacy Centers
As a final proposal, states could sponsor the development of parent
advocacy centers as an alternative to providing advocates to parents. Many
nonprofit parent advocacy centers are already in place around the country.2"'
The purpose of a parent advocacy center is to provide training and support for
parents of disabled students to prepare them to advocate for their child in PPT
meetings, due process hearings, and other interactions with the school. 11
Proponents of parent advocacy centers argue that, in most cases, it is important
to empower the parent by giving her the tools to advocate for her child on her
own. Nonetheless, most concede that in the more complicated cases, including
cases that involve language or cultural barriers, it is very helpful to have an
expert accompany the parent to IEP team meetings.
The main drawback of a parent advocacy center involves the complexity of
disability and the special education system. Many of the professionals this Note
has discussed as potential supplemental advocates have had years of training
and experience interacting with special education issues. It is doubtful that
parents will be prepared to advocate effectively for their child after two or three
training sessions. Although the centers could conceivably offer a more
comprehensive training program, the vast majority of parents are already
juggling family and work responsibilities and will not have time for evening or
weekend training sessions. For that very reason, the state could not make such
a training program mandatory, and many children would still be faced with
parents who, despite their best intentions, cannot effectively advocate for their
interests.
Nonetheless, the element of empowerment is incredibly important and
parent trainings would be a useful addition to any special advocate program
210. See, e.g., Connecticut Parent Advocacy Center (CPAC), http://www.cpacinc.org (last visited
Feb. 7, 2008).
211. Interview with Nancy Prescott, Executive Dir., CPAC, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 8,
2007).
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instituted by the state or a private entity. Due to the complexity and dynamic
nature of disability and special education, however, it would be improper to
rely on parents to obtain training on their own time. The end result of such an
expectation would be inconsistent parental representation, which does not
solve the problems that this Note identifies.
Each of these three proposals juggles ideas about access, accountability, and
funding. Nonetheless, each of the three embodies the spirit of the IDEA. The
IDEA envisions parents and schools acting as a team to provide services to
disabled children. The school is charged with informing and including the
parent in all major decisions about the child's receipt of special education
services. The parent, in turn, is charged with correcting the school when it fails
or makes a mistake. However, the IDEA presumes great knowledge and ability
on the part of the parent, and that knowledge is not guaranteed, for all the
reasons discussed in Part III. This Note proposes the addition of a third
member of the team: an objective party with expertise about special education
and public school systems who can advocate for the child in a way most parents
cannot, and who does not face the financial and resource constraints of the
school. An external advocate fills the gap left by the IDEA's team formulation.
Unless that gap is filled somehow, children like Jeremy and Adam will
continue to struggle with the public school system. Such an arrangement is
unacceptable and will continue to be inequitable unless parents receive some
help.
CONCLUSION
At its core, this Note is about helping parents help their children. A
plethora of literature discusses social policies to help parents with childcare,
early development, regular education, and health care. Many of these policies,
such as the Head Start early child development programs, have been
implemented with great success. This shows beyond a doubt that feasible
social policies that assist families reap broad benefits for society at large.
Parents with disabled children face even greater challenges than do other
parents. Despite their best efforts, they do not naturally have the knowledge
required to advocate for their child in some institutional interactions. The
team-based approach suggested by this Note utilizes the parent's unique
knowledge of her child, the school's area expertise, and the external advocate's
objective analysis in an attempt to serve the interests of the child.
There is no systematic evidence supporting or criticizing the idea of
external advocacy for special education. We simply do not know what works
and what does not. Given the serious issues presented in this Note, however, it
would be worthwhile to fund pilot programs aimed at addressing the issues of
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inadequate parental advocacy and special education. School districts could pick
and choose from the various options suggested in terms of access,
accountability, and funding. While a voucher system with a concrete access
point might be best for some localities, a full-time employee program with
thirty-day trial periods available to any student might be more effective in
another school district. The discussion here is meant to serve as a starting
point; by identifying a weakness within the special education system we can
now begin to determine how best to address that weakness. Also, by focusing
the implementation of supplemental advocacy programs at the local level, it is
possible to avoid the federalism concerns that might arise if the federal
government were to impose additional requirements on states and localities
through the IDEA.
In any case, only with some form of assistance to parents can the IDEA
achieve its stated goals and carry out its system of reliance on procedural
protections.
